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Neutrality As Political Opinion: A New
Asylum Standard for a Post-Elias-Zacarias
World
Mark G. Artlipt
Just as antimatter is an expression of matter, and atheism is
arguably a form of religious belief, many courts and commenta-
tors have philosophized that neutrality constitutes a form of
political opinion. This philosophical question becomes a real-life
controversy when an alien seeks asylum in the United States
under the Refugee Act of 1980 ("Refugee Act")' by claiming a
fear of persecution on account of his neutrality rather than
because of a traditional political stance.
Consider, for example, Joe Victim, a peasant in the tiny
republic of San Marcos. One evening, guerrillas from the San
Marcos People's Front visit Joe at his home and "invite" him to
join their war against the oppressive military government. Facing
an offer he should not refuse, Joe nonetheless resists the re-
cruitment, voicing his desire to remain neutral in the ongoing
conflict. The guerrillas threaten Joe and leave, at which point Joe
packs his bags and leaves-for the United States. Upon being
caught entering the United States illegally, Joe applies for po-
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Pub L No 96-212, 94 Stat 102 (1980), codified at 8 USC §§ 1101 et seq (1988 &
Supp 1992). Under the Refugee Act, an alien may petition for asylum in the United
States, 8 USC § 1158, if he can demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, political opinion, or social group membership in his homeland. See 8 USC
§ 1101(a)(42)(A).
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litical asylum. His application raises two questions: Is Joe's
neutrality a form of protected political opinion, and was he
persecuted on account of this opinion?
A series of cases involving refugees like Joe2 has drawn the
attention of the federal courts to the question of neutrality as
political opinion. The Ninth Circuit began the debate by classify-
ing neutrality as political opinion.3 Later, the Eleventh Circuit
suggested that if faced with the question, it would rule that
political neutrality cannot qualify as a political opinion.4 Other
courts have declined to follow either lead and have cautiously
sought some middle ground.'
In INS v Elias-Zacarias, a case with facts similar to Joe's
situation, the Supreme Court held that a guerrilla organization's
attempt to coerce a person into performing military service does
not necessarily constitute persecution on account of political
opinion.6 While it did not explicitly decide whether political
neutrality qualifies as a political opinion under the Refugee Act,
the Court did offer important insights into the proper statutory
interpretation of the Act and the proper standard of judicial
review.
This Comment proposes a post-Elias-Zacarias standard
under which neutrality qualifies as a political opinion under the
Refugee Act in two instances: either the refugee chooses to be
neutral for political reasons, or the persecutor mistakenly im-
putes a political opinion to the non-politically motivated neutral.
This standard, borrowing from a standard proposed by the First
Circuit, harmonizes the Ninth Circuit's overly broad interpreta-
tion of neutrality as political opinion with the Eleventh Circuit's
overly narrow approach.
' The classic examples are refugees from El Salvador. As of the writing of this Com-
ment, an uncharacteristic calm has settled over Central America in general and El Salva-
dor in particular. While one certainly hopes that the issues addressed in this Comment
will soon be merely interesting legal questions devoid of any real importance, the historic
instability of Central America, as well as recent civil strife in Haiti, Yugoslavia, and
Somalia, counsel that a workable standard for adjudicating asylum claims based on
political neutrality will unfortunately remain of great practical significance.
See Bolanos-Hernandez v INS, 767 F2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir 1985).
See Perlera-Escobar v Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F2d 1292, 1297-98
(11th Cir 1990). The court noted "the fact" that treating a neutral position as a "political
opinion" for purposes of the Refugee Act "would create a sinkhole that would swallow the
rule." Id at 1298, citing Umanzor v Lambert, 782 F2d 1299, 1303 n 5 (5th Cir 1986).
' See, for example, Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 19 1 & N Dec 509 (BIA 1988); Novoa-
Umania v INS, 896 F2d 1 (1st Cir 1990).
6 112 S Ct 812, 816 (1992).
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Section I explores the language and legislative history of the
Refugee Act and explains how the Refugee Act represents a re-
sponse to perceived defects in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 ("Immigration Act").' Section II examines the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Elias-Zacarias, which touches
on, but does not expressly decide, whether neutrality can consti-
tute political opinion under the Refugee Act. Section III describes
the varied approaches of the circuit courts of appeals and the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). Finally, Section IV re-
views the viability of these approaches in light of Elias-Zacarias
and argues for three main propositions. First, circuit courts need
not automatically defer to BIA interpretations of the Refugee
Act's political opinion provisions. Second, an alien who affirma-
tively chooses neutrality for political reasons is entitled to refu-
gee status if the complained-of persecution occurred because the
persecutor disliked neutrals, the alien refused to adopt the
persecutor's political opinions, or the persecutor misinterpreted
the alien's neutrality to be an expression of support for the
persecutor's enemy. Third, if the alien's neutrality was not politi-
cally motivated, he is entitled to refugee status only if the perse-
cutor misinterpreted his stance as political.
I. THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980
Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 in part to modern-
ize American immigration law, which many felt had become
inappropriately geographically and ideologically biased, as well
as overly discretionary.' The Act marked a major shift from the
"restrictive and xenophobic immigration policy embodied in the
national origins system and codified in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952."' Although the 1965 amendments to the
Immigration Act had replaced the old national origins system
with a priority system based mainly on family reunification and
job skill criteria, refugee policy remained riddled with ideological
and geographic restrictions."
7 Pub L No 82-414, 66 Stat 163 (1952), codified at 8 USC §§ 1101 et seq (1988).
' See generally Deborah E. Anker and Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 San Diego L Rev 9, 43-64 (1981).
9 Id at 10. Few today would endorse such a policy. But see Patrick Buchanan, quoted
in Newsweek 17 (Dec 23, 1991) ("[11f we had to take a million immigrants in, say, Zulus
next year, or Englishmen, and put them in Virginia, what group would be easier to
assimilate and would cause less problems ... ?").
1" See Anker and Posner, 19 San Diego L Rev at 18. For example, refugee protection
was only available to those who had fled from persecution in a "Communist or Commu-
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The Refugee Act of 1980 changed this system, first and fore-
most, by defining the term "refugee" in an unbiased manner.
Under the Act, "refugee" includes any person who is unable or
unwilling to return to his home country "because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."" The Refugee Act then applies this definition to those
seeking asylum; 2 similar requirements apply to those seeking a
withholding of deportation."
The drafters of the Refugee Act sought to harmonize the
United States's definition of refugee with the definition set out in
the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Stat-
us of Refugees ("Protocol"). 4 Accordingly, the Refugee Act's def-
inition of refugee is essentially the same as the United
Nations's. 5 Unfortunately, neither the Refugee Act nor the Pro-
tocol defines "political opinion." As a result, the courts have been
left to determine on their own the meaning and scope of the Act's
"political opinion" provisions and whether neutrality qualifies as
such political opinion.
nist-dominated country" or a "country within the general area of the Middle East." Immi-
gration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub L No 89-236, § 3(a)(7), 79 Stat 911,
913 (1965), codified at 8 USC § 1153(a)(7) (1976 & Supp 1979). While refugee admission
was also allowed for "persons uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity," id, this provi-
sion was never used. See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff and David A. Martin, Immigration:
Process and Policy 709 n 11 (West, 2d ed 1991).
" 8 USC § 1101(a)(42)(A).
12 8 USC § 1158(a). An alien may petition for asylum to an Asylum Officer with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), 8 CFR § 208.2(a) (1992), or, in certain
circumstances, an Immigration Judge with the Executive Office of Immigration Review
("EOIR"). 8 CFR § 208.2(b) (1992). A denial of asylum is appealable to the BIA, 8 CFR §
3.1(b) (1992), and BIA determinations are appealable to the United States Court of
Appeals. 8 USC § 1105a(a).
13 8 USC § 1253(h)(1). Petitions for withholding of deportation follow procedures simi-
lar to those for asylum applications. 8 CFR § 208.3(b) (1992). The primary difference is
that the Attorney General has no discretion to deport an alien who meets the definition of
refugee if he shows a "clear probability" that his "life or freedom would be threatened" in
his homeland. See INS v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421, 429-30 & n 9 (1987), citing 8 USC
§ 1253(h)(1).
14 See Refugee Act of 1980, S Rep No 96-590, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 19 (1980); The
Refugee Act of 1979, S Rep No 96-256, 96th Cong, 1st Sess 14-15 (1979); The Refugee Act
of 1979, HR Rep No 96-608, 96th Cong, 1st Sess 9 (1979). See also Anker and Posner, 19
San Diego L Rev at 60-61 (cited in note 8).
"5 See INS v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US at 436-41.
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II. INS v ELIAS-ZACARIAS
The Supreme Court brushed upon the issue of neutrality as
political opinion in INS v Elias-Zacarias."6 In Elias-Zacarias, a
Guatemalan citizen sought asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion because of his fear of persecution from anti-government
guerrillas on account of his refusal to join them.'7 Elias-Zacarias
testified that armed guerrillas visited his home one night and
attempted to coerce him and his parents into joining their ar-
my.'8 Elias-Zacarias told the Immigration Judge hearing the
case that he "did not want to join the guerrillas because the guer-
rillas are against the government and he was afraid that the gov-
ernment would retaliate against him and his family if he did join
the guerrillas."9
The Immigration Judge concluded that Elias-Zacarias had
not made the requisite showing of a "well-founded fear" of perse-
cution on account of political opinion and dismissed his claims. °
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Immigration Judge's ruling on
the asylum claim, holding that Elias-Zacarias had evidenced a
well-founded fear of conscription by the guerrillas-a political
organization persecuting for political reasons.2'
The Supreme Court, having granted certiorari to address the
relatively narrow issue of "whether a guerrilla organization's
attempt to coerce a person into performing military service neces-
sarily constitutes 'persecution on account of... political opinion'
under § 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,"22
reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the "generalized" politi-
cal motivation underlying the dragooning tactics of the Guatema-
lan guerrillas did not "establish ... the proposition that Elias-
Zacarias fears persecution on account of political opinion, as §
101(a)(42) requires."23 The Ninth Circuit had held that conscrip-
tion by a guerrilla group necessarily constitutes persecution on
account of political opinion because "the person resisting forced
16 112 S Ct 812 (1992).
17 Id at 814-15.
18 Id at 814.
19 Id.
Id at 815.
21 Zacarias v United States INS, 921 F2d 844, 851-52 (9th Cir 1990). Although the
Ninth Circuit held that Elias-Zacarias had satisfied the "well-founded fear" element of his
asylum claim, the court agreed with the Immigration Judge's finding that there was not
evidence of the "clear probability" of persecution necessary to support a withholding of
deportation. Id.
2 112 S Ct at 814.
Id at 816.
1994]
The University of Chicago Law Review
recruitment is expressing a political opinion hostile to the perse-
cutor and because the persecutors' motive in carrying out the
kidnapping is political."24 To this, the Court replied, "[t]he first
half of this seems to us untrue, and the second half irrele-
vant."
25
The Court thus overruled an important element of Ninth
Circuit refugee law-the presumption that forced recruitment by
a group with political goals necessarily equals political persecu-
tion." According to the Court, the phrase "persecution on ac-
count of... political opinion" means "persecution on account of
the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's."27 The Court
held that the guerilla's underlying political agenda did not estab-
lish persecution on account of political opinion; the forced recruit-
ment feared by Elias-Zacaias would likely "be engaged in by the
guerrillas in order to augment their troops rather than show
their displeasure" at Elias-Zacarias's non-acquiescence.'
Despite its proximity to the question of whether political
neutrality can constitute political opinion under the Refugee Act,
the Court declined to rule on that issue.' The Court did note,
however, that while "Elias-Zacarias appears to argue that not
taking sides with any political faction is itself the affirmative
expression of a political opinion[, tlhat seems to us not ordinarily
so. . . ." The Court also emphasized that the concept of "polit-
ical opinion" under the Refugee Act must be distinguished "from
such quite different concepts as indifference, indecisiveness and
risk-averseness.'
Moreover, even if a person based an asylum claim on politi-
cal neutrality, the Court implied that he would have to have
chosen neutrality for political reasons. The Court reasoned that:
24 Zacarias, 921 F2d at 850.
Elias-Zacarias, 112 S Ct at 815.
26 See Arteaga v INS, 836 F2d 1227, 1232 a 8 (9th Cir 1988); Maldonado-Cruz v Dept
of Immigration and Naturalization, 883 F2d 788, 791 (9th Cir 1989); Zacarias, 921 F2d at
850.
82 Elias-Zacarias, 112 S Ct at 816, quoting 8 USc § 1101(a)(42).
8 Id at 816 & n 2.
9 [We need not decide whether the evidence compels the conclusion that Elias-
Zacarias held a political opinion. Even if it does, Elias-Zacarias still has to establish
that the record also compels the conclusion that he has a 'well-founded' fear that the
guerrillas will persecute him because of that political opinion, rather than because of
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Even a person who supports a guerrilla movement might
resist recruitment for a variety of reasons-fear of combat, a
desire to remain with one's family and friends, a desire to
earn a better living in civilian life, to mention only a few.
The record in the present case not only failed to show a
political motive on Elias-Zacarias' part; it showed the oppo-
site."
In a spirited dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor, criticized the majority's "narrow, grudg-
ing construction of the concept of 'political opinion.""' The dis-
senters would have adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach and
held that "[a] refusal to support a cause ... can express a politi-
cal opinion as effectively as an affirmative statement or affirma-
tive conduct." 4 Further, the dissenters maintained that a refus-
al to support a cause need not be politically motivated to merit a
grant of asylum."5
III. NEUTRALITY As POLITICAL OPINION
Although Elias-Zacarias does reflect a certain skepticism
toward neutrality claims, the holding ultimately rested on Elias-
Zacarias's failure to meet his burden of proof. The Court's com-
ments on whether "not taking sides" is an expression of political
opinion are clearly dicta. Consequently, whether neutrality can
be a political opinion remains an open question for lower courts.
The issue has been directly addressed only by the BIA and the
Ninth Circuit. Additionally, the First and Eleventh Circuits have
discussed this question in dicta.36
32 Id at 815-16.
Id at 818 (Stevens dissenting).
Id (Stevens dissenting).
Id (Stevens dissenting) ("Even if the refusal is motivated by nothing more than a
simple desire to continue living an ordinary life with one's family, it is the kind of po-
litical expression that the asylum provisions of the statute were intended to protect.").
' The Fourth Circuit has also adjudicated cases raising the issue of neutrality as
political opinion, but has decided these cases on other grounds. Still, dicta in these cases
reflects some hostility toward the Ninth Circuit conception of "political opinion." For
example, in Cruz-Lopez v INS, 802 F2d 1518, 1521 (4th Cir 1986), the court noted that
"Cruz-Lopez's position [that of refusing to join an El Salvadoran guerrilla group] is no
different from that of many young, urban males 'invited' to join guerrilla groups. Unfortu-
nately, this country cannot serve as a haven for all of them." See also Figeroa v INS, 886
F2d 76, 80-81 (4th Cir 1989) (stating that a generalized fear of persecution by both sides
in civil conflict for remaining neutral "reflect[s] the dangers faced by virtually all young El
Salvadoran males"); MA. A26851062 v INS, 899 F2d 304, 316 (4th Cir 1990) (noting that
the Refugee Act does not recognize asylum eligibility for those who merely fear general
1994]
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A. The Ninth Circuit: Neutrality Constitutes Political Opinion
Since 1985, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed that
neutrality is a political opinion for purposes of the Refugee Act
and that persecution or fear of persecution relating to such neu-
trality will ordinarily warrant asylum relief. 7 According to the
court in Bolanos-Hernandez v INS, "[cihoosing to remain neutral
is no less a political decision than is choosing to affiliate with a
particular political faction .... When a person is aware of con-
tending political forces and affirmatively chooses not to join any
faction, that choice is a political one.""
As noted above, this recognition of neutrality as a protected
form of political opinion was not explicitly overruled by Elias-
Zacarias. The Ninth Circuit's methods for granting asylum relief
premised upon neutrality have, however, been called into ques-
tion to varying degrees by the Elias-Zacarias decision.
The Ninth Circuit's policy of granting asylum relief in neu-
trality cases is an extremely generous one, demanding little of
the applicant. First, neutrality need not be chosen for political
reasons." The Bolanos-Hernandez court reasoned that an inqui-
ry into a person's motivation for choosing neutrality is improper,
imprecise, and irrelevant: "The guerrillas in El Salvador do not
inquire into the reasoning process of those who insist on remain-
ing neutral and refuse to join their cause. They are concerned
only with an act that constitutes an overt manifestation of a
violence in war-tom El Salvador).
'3 Since the passage of the Refugee Act in 1980, the Ninth Circuit has played a
particularly significant role in interpreting the Act's provisions. See generally Carolyn P.
Blum, The Ninth Circuit and the Protection of Asylum Seekers Since the Passage of the
Refugee Act of 1980, 23 San Diego L Rev 327, 328-39 (1986).
The decisions of the Ninth Circuit regarding the parameters of "political opinion" are
of great importance not only because of their innovative and often expansive readings of
the provisions of the Refugee Act, but also because the Circuit is responsible for more
published decisions interpreting the Act than any other circuit. See id at 329 n 12 (noting
that the Ninth Circuit is responsible for over 40% of the published decisions interpreting
the Refugee Act as of 1986); Comment, Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigra-
tion: Political Asylum and the Question of Neutrality, 18 Brooklyn J Intl L 251, 255 & n
20 (1992) (noting that a large majority of asylum applications are decided in the Ninth
Circuit).
- 767 F2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir 1985). Bolanos, a former member of a right-wing po-
litical party and the El Salvadoran military, had testified that he was threatened with
death after refusing to join an anti-government guerrilla group due to "his desire to
remain neutral and not be affiliated with any political group." Id at 1280. The Ninth Cir-
cuit panel reversed the decision of the BIA, which, like the INS, had denied Bolanos's ap-
plication for political asylum and withholding of deportation. Id.
' For a discussion of victims' political motivation after Elias-Zacarias, see text ac-
companying notes 98-109.
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political opinion."0 While thus acknowledging that neutrality
may be chosen for non-political reasons, the Bolanos-Hernandez
court held that "[w]hatever the motivation, an individual's choice,
once made, constitutes, for better or for worse, a manifestation of
political opinion," and that "[p]ersecution because of that overt
manifestation is persecution because of a political opinion."4'
Second, an asylum seeker need not even express his neutrali-
ty to his persecutor. 42 As long as the applicant affirmatively
chooses neutrality and makes an overt act from which neutrality
can be inferred, the fact that he never articulates his neutrality
is irrelevant. 3
Third, so long as the persecutor has an underlying political
agenda, the persecutor's specific motivation is irrelevant." This
premise is most relevant in forced recruitment cases, where it
often appears that guerrilla dragooning efforts are motivated by
a desire to augment troop strength rather than punish political
enemies.45 In Arteaga v INS, the Ninth Circuit considered it ir-
relevant that the guerrillas may have conscripted the petitioner
to fill their ranks rather than punish his neutrality: "Clearly,
forced recruitment into the war against the government is politi-
cally motivated."46 Recognizing that courts generally reject per-
secution claims premised on conscription into a foreign
government's national army,47 Arteaga held:
40 Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F2d at 1287.
41 Id.
42 Argueta v INS, 759 F2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir 1985). The petitioner in Argueta
testified that four Death Squad members had falsely accused him of being a member of
the FPL, an anti-government guerrilla organization, and threatened him with "disappear-
ance" if he did not leave the country. Id at 1395-96. The court held that the petitioner
affirmatively chose neutrality, even though he never expressed this opinion to his alleged
persecutors. Id at 1397.
41 See Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F2d at 1286-87.
" See Zacarias, 921 F2d at 850, 852. This issue was addressed and overruled in
Elias-Zacarias. See text accompanying notes 16-32.
" As in Elias-Zacarias. See 112 S Ct at 816 n 2.
4r 836 F2d 1227, 1232 n 8 (9th Cir 1988). See also Del Valle v INS, 776 F2d 1407 (9th
Cir 1985). In Del Valle, a petitioner for asylum and withholding of deportation testified
that after rejecting repeated offers to become an informer for a right-wing group known as
the "Squadron of Death" he was abducted and beaten by members of the group. Id at
1409-10. The court held, without finding it necessary to inquire into the group members'
motives, that "Del Valle's refusal, in combination with his deliberate non-involvement
prior to his refusal, does evidence [expression of political opinion]." Id at 1414 n 5.
", See Kaveh.Haghigy v INS, 783 F2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir 1986) (holding that poten-
tial conscription into the Iranian army was not persecution: "Absent exceptional circum-
stances, it is not the place of the judiciary to evaluate the political justifications of the
actions of foreign governments"); Glavic v Beechie, 225 F Supp 24, 27 (S D Tex 1963)
(holding that required service in the Yugoslav national army is not the type of persecution
19941
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Whatever justification exists for distinguishing between
national military conscription and deprivations of freedom,
such justification does not apply to actions of nongovernmen-
tal groups, which lack legitimate authority to raise armies
by conscription. Forced recruitment by a revolutionary army
is tantamount to kidnapping, and is therefore persecution.48
Finally, neutrality may constitute political opinion in the
Ninth Circuit when a "persecutor falsely attributes an opinion to
the victim, and then persecutes the victim because of that mis-
taken belief about the victim's views."49 This theory is known as
the doctrine of imputed political opinion, and the Ninth Circuit
has recently reaffirmed its vitality, noting that "[niothing in
Elias-Zacarias changes our analysis.""
Within the doctrine of imputed political opinion, the Ninth
Circuit has even held that the imputation of political opinion
need not be genuine.5" In Lazo-Majano v INS, the petitioner tes-
tified that she had fled to the United States because a sergeant
in the El Salvadoran military had repeatedly raped and brutal-
ized her, threatening to brand her a "subversive" and kill her if
she reported him.52 While the court conceded that the sergeant
probably never believed that Lazo-Majano was a subversive, it
nonetheless held that a cynical and manipulative imputation of
political opinion can transform a personal tragedy into political
persecution."3
that justifies parole into the United States). See also Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 US
366, 378 (1918) (rejecting a claim that conscription is repugnant to a free government);
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status § 167 at 39-40 (United Nations, 1988) ("Fear
of prosecution and punishment for desertion or draft-evasion does not in itself constitute
well-founded fear of persecution under the definition.").
Exceptions may arise, however, where the conscription is a pretext for imposing a
disproportionately severe punishment on a person because of his race, religion, nationali-
ty, social group membership, or political opinion, or where the military service would force
the alien to engage in "inhuman conduct." See Mark R. von Sternberg, Emerging Bases of
"Persecution" in American Refugee Law: Political Opinion and the Dilemma of Neutrality,
13 Suffolk Transnatl L J 1, 48 (1989).
'8 Arteaga, 836 F2d at 1232.
'9 Canas-Segovia v INS, 970 F2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir 1992).
'" Id.
" For a discussion of insincerely imputed political opinion, see text accompanying
notes 120-24.
-2 813 F2d 1432, 1433 (9th Cir 1987).
' Id at 1435-36. See also Desir v Ilchert, 840 F2d 723, 729 (9th Cir 1988) ("Desir's ac-
tual political view at the time ... is not relevant to our assessment of his refugee status
[because his persecutors had falsely attributed one to him].").
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Although Elias-Zacarias overruled some aspects of the Ninth
Circuit's view of neutrality, the Ninth Circuit continues to treat
neutrality as a political opinion for purposes of the Refugee Act
in two situations: when a person is persecuted for affirmatively
maintaining a neutral stance,' 4 or when a persecutor imputes a
political opinion to a person and attacks him because of it.55 Fur-
thermore, despite language to the contrary in Elias-Zacarias,5M
the Ninth Circuit apparently still does not require that an alien's
neutrality be politically motivated. 7
B. The Eleventh Circuit: Neutrality Does Not Constitute
Political Opinion
At the other pole lies the Eleventh Circuit, which has indi-
cated that it approves of the position that political neutrality
should never constitute a political opinion. The Eleventh Circuit's
first and only published opinion discussing the issue came in
Perlera-Escobar v Executive Office for Immigration."
In Perlera-Escobar, the petitioner testified that he was politi-
cally neutral in the ongoing civil war in his homeland but had
been unwillingly caught up in the strife. Escobar claimed that he
feared persecution by the government for being a rebel and per-
secution by the guerrillas for being a deserter.59 The Eleventh
Circuit deferred to the BIA's decision that the facts of the case
did not support a claim of persecution on account of political
opinion." In so doing, the Perlera-Escobar court noted that
This stance can be manifested either by an affirmative decision not to join any
political faction, see Argueta, 759 F2d at 1397, or by an affirmative refusal to accept an
"invitation" to join a particular side. See Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F2d at 1287 ("By choos-
ing neutrality and refusing to join a particular political faction, Bolanos expressed his
opinion and took a political stance."); Del Valle, 776 F2d at 1414 ("When approached on
several occasions, by the Squadron of Death, he did not accept their invitation to join. Del
Valle has therefore made a considered choice to take a neutral stance.. . ."); Maldonado-
Cruz, 883 F2d at 791-92 (Where the petitioner had escaped from an El Salvadoran guer-
rilla camp after forcible conscription, his "refusal to join [the guerrillas] was a manifesta-
tion of his neutrality, which is a recognized political opinion.").
' As noted above, this imputation can be genuine or contrived. See text accompany-
ing notes 49-53.
See text accompanying notes 104-09.
', See Canas-Segovia, 970 F2d at 601-02. In this case, subsequent to Elias-Zacarias,
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court's requirement that political motiva-
tion on the part of the persecutor be shown. In considering this requirement to be satis-
fied by imputed political opinion, however, the Canas-Segovia court implicitly held that
the petitioner was entitled to political asylum even though his refusal to serve in the El
Salvadoran armed forces was motivated by his religious, rather than political, beliefs.
5 894 F2d 1292 (11th Cir 1990).
59 Id at 1294.
' Id at 1299. In support of this deference, the court commented that "[wihat consti-
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"[tihis circuit has not adopted the Ninth Circuit's belief that
political neutrality is a political opinion for purposes of the
Act."6 Such an interpretation would, in the Eleventh Circuit's
view, "create a sinkhole that would swallow the rule."62
The Perlera-Escobar court also declined to apply the Ninth
Circuit's imputed political opinion doctrine to neutrals. In explor-
ing the motivation of the guerrillas in persecuting Escobar, the
court argued that "the guerrillas care not what Escobar thinks or
believes; rather their interest in him stems from their need to
preserve unity and order in their ranks and to ensure the secrecy
of their operations."63 Thus, under the Eleventh Circuit ap-
proach, not even politically motivated or politically labelled neu-
trals would qualify for asylum based on their well-founded fears.
C. The BIA: Neutrality May Constitute Political Opinion Under
Some Circumstances
The Board of Immigration Appeals has adopted neither the
Ninth Circuit's broad view of neutrality as political opinion nor
the Eleventh Circuit's prohibitive view.64 Instead, the BIA ap-
pears to assume that neutrality may constitute political opinion
under the Refugee Act.65 However, the BIA then holds appli-
cants to a very strict standard of proof; in its two published opin-
tutes a political opinion under the Act is a political question which the courts are not
especially qualified to decide." Id. For a criticism of the view that the proper interpreta-
tion of "political opinion" under the Refugee Act is a non-justiciable political question, see
Comment, 18 Brooklyn J Intl L at 263-70 (cited in note 37).
61 894 F2d at 1297 n 4. Still, the Perlera-Escobar court declined to rule "whether 'no
opinion' constitutes an opinion under the Act because even assuming that it does, Escobar
never openly articulated his position, nor has he shown that the guerrillas pursue him be-
cause of his neutrality." Id at 1298, citing Arteaga v INS, 836 F2d 1227 (9th Cir 1988).
62 Id at 1298.
Id. Perlera-Escobar may be distinguished from Arteaga on the grounds that the
BIA in Perlera-Escobar did not believe that Escobar was forcibly recruited. See id at 1297
n 4. Nonetheless, the Perlera-Escobar court created a rebuttable presumption (or at least
happily deferred to a BIA presumption) that revolutionary armies exercise control over
their troops for non-political reasons. Id at 1298-99. This differs from the Arteaga pre-
sumption that actions of a political faction in furtherance of its political goals are neces-
sarily politically motivated. See Arteaga, 836 F2d at 1232 n 8.
In adjudicating asylum and withholding of deportation claims, the BIA is only obli-
gated to follow the decisions of the federal appellate court for the circuit in which it sits.
In those circuits in which the federal appellate court has not decided an issue, the BIA
may apply its own standard. Because only the Ninth Circuit has definitively ruled on the
question of neutrality as political opinion, the BIA remains free to apply its own standard
in all other jurisdictions.
6 See Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 19 1 & N Dec 509, 516 (BIA 1988); Matter of Vigil,
19 1 & N Dec 572, 576 (BIA 1988).
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ions dealing with neutrality as political opinion, the BIA did not
grant relief.
The BIA position places three requirements on neutral asy-
lum-seekers. First, the applicant must hold a "principled position
of neutrality."66 While the BIA in Matter of Maldonado-Cruz did
not elaborate meaningfully on what makes a neutrality position
"principled," the BIA implied that neutrality must be a conscious,
politically motivated choice and not merely the absence of a polit-
ical view. Second, the applicant must have expressed his neutral-
ity publicly. While the applicant for political asylum in In re
Vigil had made a principled decision to remain neutral in the El
Salvadoran civil war, the BIA found it significant that he had not
expressed this view to anyone.6 Finally, the alien's neutrality
must be the direct cause of the complained-of persecution. Unless
the victim "has received some threat or could be 'singled out' for
persecution because of [his] neutrality opinion," his plight does
not qualify as persecution on account of political opinion under
the Refugee Act.69 Therefore, if the persecutor merely seeks to
enforce military discipline by punishing desertion,7° or augment
guerrilla troop strength through forced recruitment,7' relief un-
der the Refugee Act is unavailable.
D. The First Circuit: A Hypothetical Middle Ground
Although it has not ruled on the question of neutrality as
political opinion, the First Circuit discussed the issue in dicta in
Novoa-Umania v INS.7" There, the court proposed a standard of
review narrower than the Ninth Circuit's standard but broader
than the BIA's. In Novoa-Umania, an El Salvadoran citizen tes-
tified that both the government and the anti-government
guerrillas had threatened to kill him because each interpreted
his "neutrality" as support for the other side. 3 As did the BIA,
the court assumed that neutrality could constitute political opin-
ion.74 The court then interpreted the statutory definition of "ref-
ugee" to require that an asylum petitioner claiming persecution
Maldonado-Cruz, 19 1 & N Dec at 516.
See Vigil, 19 1 & N Dec at 576-77.
68 Id at 577.
6 Id at 576.
70 See Maldonado-Cruz, 19 1 & N Dec at 514-15.
7, See Vigil, 19 1 & N Dec at 577-78.
72 896 F2d 1 (1st Cir 1990).
7 Id at 2-3.
7' Id at 3.
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on account of political neutrality be able to demonstrate a well-
founded fear of one of the following:
1) that a group with the power to persecute him intends to
do so specifically because the group dislikes neutrals, or 2)
that such a group intends to persecute him because he will
not accept its political point of view, or 3) that one or more
groups intend to persecute him because each (incorrectly)
thinks he holds the political views of the other side. 5
The court held that the petitioner failed to meet any prong of this
test.76 Thus, under the First Circuit approach, a petitioner's ex-
pression of neutrality is entitled to Refugee Act protection if the
three-part-Novoa-Umania test indicates that the expression is
linked to traditional political persecution.
IV. A WORKABLE STANDARD FOR NEUTRALITY AS POLITICAL
OPINION
As discussed earlier, the Elias-Zacarias opinion does not
resolve the question of whether neutrality may ever constitute a
political opinion under the Refugee Act. Nonetheless, Elias-
Zacarias does offer important insights into this issue. First, the
case indicates that the question of whether neutrality constitutes
political opinion under the Refugee Act is a legal question that
does not require automatic deference to Immigration Judge and
BIA determinations. Second, Elias-Zacarias implies that the
"political opinion" provisions of the Refugee Act, properly inter-
preted, allow neutrality to constitute political opinion under some
circumstances.
Recognizing that neutrality constitutes political opinion un-
der some circumstances does not, however, tell us what these cir-
cumstances are. This Comment argues that the First Circuit's
hypothetical test answers this question, providing a useful stan-
dard for adjudicating asylum and withholding-of-deportation
claims premised upon political neutrality. Under this test, a
victim can receive relief only if the persecutor sought to punish
the victim because (1) the persecutor dislikes neutrals, (2) the
victim refused to conform his ideas to those of his persecutor, or
75 Id.
71 Id at 3-4. See also Alvarez-Flores v INS, 909 F2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir 1990). The court
there assumed, but did not decide, that neutrality could constitute a political opinion;
applying the three-part Novoa-Umania test, the court concluded that the petitioner did
not qualify for asylum. Id.
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(3) the persecutor wrongly interpreted the victim's neutrality to
be support for the persecutor's enemy. Finally, the Comment sup-
plements this test by suggesting that the victim must have a
political motive for choosing neutrality under elements (1) and
(2), but not element (3). Under element (3), however, the
persecutor's mistake must be genuine.
A. Judicial Deference
Before positing substantive legal standards for the circuit
courts to utilize in deciding asylum cases premised on political
neutrality, one must first determine whether judicial review is
warranted at all. Courts, of course, do not have free rein in revis-
iting the decisions rendered by administrative agencies such as
the BIA. This is especially true regarding agency findings of fact.
Indeed, the Elias-Zacarias Court noted that the BIA's factual
determinations "can be reversed only if the evidence present-
ed... was such that a reasonable factfinder would have to con-
clude that the requisite fear of persecution existed."77 However,
while much of the initial determination of an alien's eligibility for
relief under the Refugee Act involves mixed questions of fact and
law,78 interpreting the scope of the "on account of political opin-
ion" clause of the Act would seem to be a purely legal question.
Unlike garnering facts or judging credibility, tasks for which the
BIA unquestionably has a special competence, there is no reason
to believe that the BIA has special expertise in the statutory
interpretation of terms of art such as "political opinion."
The beginning point for any inquiry into an administrative
agency's legal determination is Chevron, U.S.A. v Natural Re-
sources Defense Council.79 Chevron laid down the following stan-
dard for judicial review of statutory construction by agencies:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however,... the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
' 112 S Ct at 815.
78 Note, Persecution on Account of Political Opinion: "Refugee" Status After INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), 67 Wash L Rev 959, 961 (1992).
79 467 US 837 (1984).
1994]
The University of Chicago Law Review
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute."
Lower courts have divided on whether Congress expressed a
clear intent in the Refugee Act with regard to persecution on
account of political opinion. The First, Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have concluded that Congress was ambiguous or expressed
no intent that the provisions of the Refugee Act be interpreted in
a particular way. Thus, these circuits have deferred to the BIA's
interpretation of the Act.8' The Ninth Circuit, on the other
hand, has not adopted this hands-off approach. Ninth Circuit
panels have routinely indicated that they can ascertain congres-
sional intent using ordinary methods of statutory construction,
and they have reviewed BIA interpretations of the Refugee Act
de novo.82
In Elias-Zacarias, the Court implicitly ratified the Ninth
Circuit view by using a "plain meaning" approach to the political
opinion provision at issue. Although the Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit decision in Elias-Zacarias, the Court did not hold
that the Ninth Circuit should have deferred to the BIA's legal
interpretation. Rather, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit had
erroneously construed the Refugee Act's political opinion provi-
sion. The Court noted that "[i]n construing statutes, 'we must, of
course, start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used."' 3 The
Court held that the ordinary meaning of "persecution on account
of political opinion" is clear: the phrase necessarily refers to "per-
secution on account of the victim's political opinions, not the
persecutor's," and "political opinion" does not ordinarily include
neutrality.84
" Id at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
8, See Alvarez-Flores, 909 F2d at 3-4; Campos-Guardado v INS, 809 F2d 285, 289-90
(5th Cir 1987); Perlera-Escobar, 894 F2d at 1296 ("The meaning and scope of the phrase
'on account of... political opinion' is not defined by the Act, nor does it appear ... that
Congress unambiguously expressed an intent that the term should be construed in a
particular way."). See also Note, Persecution Based on Political Opinion: Interpretation of
the Refugee Act of 1980, 25 Cornell Intl L J 231, 238 (1992).
82 See Canas-Segovia v INS, 902 F2d 717, 721 (9th Cir 1990), vacated, INS v Canas-
Segovia, 112 S Ct 1152 (1992); Maldonado-Cruz, 883 F2d at 791; Arteaga, 836 F2d at
1228; Desir, 840 F2d at 726. See also Note, 25 Cornell Intl L J at 237-38.
'8 Elias-Zacarias, 112 S Ct at 816, quoting Richards v United States, 369 US 1, 9
(1962).
' Elias-Zacarias, 112 S Ct at 816. This interpretation is a far cry from the axiomatic
Ninth Circuit view that "Ijiust as a nation's decision to remain neutral is a political one,
so is an individual's." Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F2d at 1286 (citation omitted).
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The Court thus resolved the dispute among the circuits as to
whether Congress spoke clearly on the meaning of "political opin-
ion." Henceforth, neither lower courts nor the BIA may declare
that Congress left the term ambiguous and up to the BIA to
specify. Thus, only one question remains open for the courts and
the BIA: under what, if any, out-of-the-ordinary circumstances
may neutrality constitute political opinion?
B. Can Neutrality Ever Constitute Political Opinion?
Although the Elias-Zacarias Court indicated that the Ninth
Circuit had erroneously equated neutrality with political opinion,
the Court did not hold that neutrality can never constitute politi-
cal opinion under the Refugee Act. Instead, it merely stated that
neutrality does not "ordinarily" constitute political opinion.85
While a bright-line rule that completely excludes neutrality
from the Refugee Act's definition of political opinion might be
easier to administer, such an approach cannot possibly comport
with the ordinary meaning of the words "persecution on account
of political opinion." How else would one classify the following
colloquy?
Guerrilla: Do you support the government or our move-
ment?
Civilian: I support neither. I disapprove of the policies
and ideologies of both sides and remain firmly
neutral in the current conflict.
Guerrilla: My comrades and I despise neutrals. We will kill
you tomorrow because of your neutrality.
Certainly only the most "narrow, grudging construction of the
concept of 'political opinion"'' 6 would deny that the civilian in
the above hypothetical faces persecution on -account of his politi-
cal opinions. Furthermore, while the Eleventh Circuit has not
adopted the Ninth Circuit's view that neutrality constitutes polit-
ical opinion,87 it has never been faced with the paradigm case
presented above-where neutrality is not merely the absence of
political opinion, but a carefully considered view of the political world."
Elias-Zacarias, 112 S Ct at 816.
See id at 818 (Stevens dissenting).
See Perlera-Escobar, 894 F2d at 1297 n 4.
In Perlera-Escobar, in fact, the court did not even have to affirmatively rule on the
question of neutrality as political opinion because the petitioner's neutrality had not been
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Yet, while the Ninth Circuit in Bolanos-Hernandez appropri-
ately rejected the position that neutrality is never political, the
court went to the opposite extreme in asserting that informed
neutrality is always political. It stretches the bounds of logic to
imply, for example, that one who does not vote is necessarily
making a political statement. A person might refrain from voting
as a means of expressing displeasure with the political system in
general or the candidates in particular; however, the non-voter
might also be stating nothing more than that he ran out of gas
on the way to the polling booth. 9 Likewise, a person might
choose a path of neutrality for purely personal reasons. Courts
have generally held that "persecution" arising out of personal
entanglements does not give rise to refugee status.0
Thus, the question of when neutrality constitutes political
opinion under the Refugee Act remains open, and the extreme
rules advocated by the Ninth and Eleventh- Circuits are clearly
unsatisfactory. It is possible, however, to arrive at an answer to
the question by considering the Supreme Court's pronouncements
on the extent to which the persecutor and victim must have polit-
ical motives in order for the Refugee Act to afford protection to
the victim.
established. In particular, "Escobar never openly articulated his position, nor has he
shown that the guerrillas pursue him because of his neutrality." Id at 1298.
" Some might argue that this example is quite naive in that it "fails to come to grips
with the realities of civil war." See, for example, von Sternberg, 13 Suffolk Transnatl L J
at 26 (cited in note 47). While failure to vote in the context of a stable democracy could
result as much from car trouble as from a particular political opinion, apolitical voter
neutrality may be much less plausible in a country caught up in civil strife, where politi-
cal questions permeate much of daily life.
While this observation might be true, it does not justify the imposition of a per se
rule that failure to vote in a civil war-torn country is necessarily the expression of a
political opinion. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that this is a fact-driven
(rather than rule-driven) inquiry by noting that political opinion must be distinguished
"from such quite different concepts as indifference, indecisiveness and risk-averseness."
Elias-Zacarias, 112 S Ct at 816.
See, for example, Zayas-Marini v INS, 785 F2d 801, 805-06 (9th Cir 1986) (Where
an alien maintained good relations with the Paraguayan government, but was threatened
with death by two government officials for opposing their corrupt practices, the Ninth
Circuit held that the alien was the victim of a personal falling-out, not political persecu-
tion.); Campos-Guardado, 809 F2d at 288-90 (Where a woman was threatened with harm
by a former guerrilla if she revealed his prior rape of her, the Fifth Circuit held that the
BIAs finding that the persecution was personal, not political, was not erroneous as a mat-
ter of law.). But see Comment, "Political Opinions" of Refugees: Interpreting International
Sources, 63 Wash L Rev 395, 412 n 108 (1988) (arguing that the Campos-Guardado court
could have legitimately found, as the Ninth Circuit did in Lazo-Majano, that Campos was
persecuted as a result of political opinions imputed to her by her attackers).
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C. Political Motivation of the Persecutor
As an initial matter, Elias-Zacarias requires that the perse-
cutor have a political motivation for threatening the neutral vic-
tim. As the Court held, "Elias-Zacarias still has to establish
that... he has a 'well-founded fear' that the guerrillas will per-
secute him because of [his] political opinion, rather than because
of his refusal to fight with them."91
Whether the persecutor is politically motivated is a fact-spe-
cific inquiry. Elias-Zacarias failed to demonstrate that the guer-
rillas would persecute him on account of his political opinions
rather than because of his refusal to join their army. While the
Court would not require a refugee like Elias-Zacarias to provide
direct evidence of the guerrillas' motives, because "the statute
makes motive critical, he must provide some evidence of it, direct
or circumstantial."92 The First Circuit's test suggests two forms
of persecutor motivation to which a neutral asylum-seeker might
point: first, that he suffered persecution because the persecutor
disliked neutrals, and second, that he was persecuted because he
refused to conform his ideas to the persecutor's.
Courts must, of course, defer to the fact-finder's assessment
of the persecutor's motive. In Elias-Zacarias, the Court an-
nounced the standard of review as follows: if an alien "seeks to
obtain judicial reversal of the BIA's determination, he must show
that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reason-
able fact-finder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecu-
tion.""3 Therefore, dragooning tactics employed by anti-govern-
ment guerrillas, for example, do not necessarily constitute politi-
cal persecution; the answer depends on the particular facts of the
case. Thus, in Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, the BIA correctly
searched the record for evidence of a political motivation on the
part of the guerrillas in kidnapping the petitioner. 4 Finding no
such motive, the BIA determined that the petitioner had not been
persecuted on account of political opinion.95 The Ninth Circuit
" Elias-Zacarias, 112 S Ct at 816.
2 Id at 816-17.
9 Id at 817.
19 I & N Dec 509, 514, 516 (BIA 1988).
Id at 516-17. Mark von Sternberg criticized the BIA's decision in Matter of
Maldonado-Cruz for "fail[ing] to come to grips with the realities of civil war and ignor[ing]
the intensification of political motivation which inevitably occurs when a country is
thrown into a climactic stage of social violence." 13 Suffolk Transnatl L J at 26 (cited in
note 47). Elias.Zacarias, however, indicates that such judicial notice of "the realities of
civil war" is improper. See 112 S Ct at 816.
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overruled the BIA's determination, reasoning that "[t]he guerril-
las are a political entity. Maldonado's refusal to join them was a
manifestation of his neutrality, which is a recognized political
opinion. Hence, any persecution by the guerrillas is a result of
Maldonado's expression of his political opinion... ."" Analyzed
in light of Elias-Zacarias, the Ninth Circuit erred in failing to
give appropriate deference to the BIA's factual determinations.
Elias-Zacarias also casts doubt upon the Ninth Circuit's
presumption regarding the motives behind government persecu-
tion. In Hernandez-Ortiz v INS, for example, the Ninth Circuit
held that where a government acts against an individual or mem-
bers of a group and there is no "legitimate basis" for that action,
there is a presumption that the government's action was political-
ly motivated. 7 Post-Elias-Zacarias, the Ninth Circuit would be
safer in presuming nothing and looking to the facts in order to
determine the government's motive.
D. Political Motivation of the Victim and the Problem of Hecky
Brown
In the Woody Allen film The Front," a comedian named
Hecky Brown is brought before the House Un-American Activi-
ties Committee ("HUAC") in the late 1950s and is accused of
being a Communist. The only evidence on Brown was that he
once marched in a leftist labor union's May Day parade. Brown
explained that he had attended the march only to impress a
young woman whose posterior dimensions he admired and who
was a member of the union. HUAC did not accept his explanation
and demanded that Brown identify other marchers for HUAC to
investigate. When Brown did not comply, HUAC blacklisted him.
This scenario raises the following issue: assuming that
HUAC's actions constituted "persecution" as we understand it
under the Refugee Act,99 to what extent can we say that Brown
was persecuted on account of his political opinions? All courts
that have addressed the issue have agreed that neutrality must
be an affirmative choice. One may not simply fail to adopt a polit-
' Maldonado-Cruz, 883 F2d at 791 (citation omitted).
97 777 F2d 509, 516 (9th Cir 1985).
" Columbia Pictures, 1976.
Obviously, we must also pretend that Brown's "persecution" occurred in another
country and he fled to the United States.
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ical position and then claim political persecution on account of
neutrality.'Oo
Under the Ninth Circuit standard, however, the choice to
remain neutral need not be made for political reasons. The un-
derlying political philosophy of the victim is of no concern, so
long as he undertook an overt act constituting "neutrality."10
The overt act does not have to be the refusal of attempted con-
scription, although this is most common in the cases. Even a
failure to act can meet the overt act requirement. In Desir v
Ilchert, for example, the petitioner failed to pay bribe money to
low-level government security forces.' 2 The court held that
"Desir's actual political view at the time, whether neutral or
partisan, or his inability to pay, is not relevant to our assessment
of his refugee status."' 3 Hecky Brown's overt act of marching in
the parade would seem to constitute a political act under the
Ninth Circuit standard. Regardless of why he acted, he acted
overtly and, to all outward appearances, politically.
After Elias-Zacarias, however, Hecky appears to be out of
luck. This is because the Court implied that the neutral victim
must have chosen neutrality for political reasons in order to be
eligible for asylum or withholding of deportation. The Court dis-
agreed with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that, by resisting
forced recruitment, Elias-Zacarias had necessarily expressed a
political opinion hostile to the guerrillas."4 To the contrary,
"[tihe record.., not only failed to show a political motive on Elias-
Zacarias' part; it showed the opposite." °5
The Court listed some other impermissible grounds for claim-
ing persecution on account of neutrality: "Even a person who
supports a guerrilla movement might resist recruitment for a
variety of reasons-fear of combat, a desire to remain with one's
family and friends, a desire to earn a better living in civilian life,
to mention only a few."0 6 The Court might very well have in-
cluded a desire to impress a member of the opposite sex.
The Ninth Circuit in Bolanos-Hernandez had previously
reasoned that "it is simply improper for the government to in-
quire into the motives underlying an individual's political deci-
'" See, for example, Lopez v INS, 775 F2d 1015, 1016-17 (9th Cir 1985).
... See Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F2d at 1286-87.
102 840 F2d 723, 724-25 (9th Cir 1988).
103 Idat 729.
104 Elias-Zacarias, 112 S Ct at 815-16.
',5 Id at 816.
10 Id at 815-16.
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sions .... [TIhe motives frequently will be both complex and
difficult to ascertain; it may not be possible to separate the politi-
cal from the non-political aspects."'0 7 The Supreme Court reject-
ed this position in Elias-Zacarias, where Justice Scalia betrayed
no sense of impropriety in inquiring into Elias-Zacarias's mo-
tives.' Indeed, the task of separating political from non-politi-
cal motivation seems no more complex or difficult than many
other permissible types of judicial fact-finding."9
Elias-Zacarias thus dictates that, in the typical neutrality-
as-political-opinion case, the victim must have had a political
motive for choosing neutrality, and his tormentor must have
persecuted him for political reasons. Under these requirements,
Hecky Brown would apparently be denied asylum. Although his
persecutors, HUAC, are unquestionably politically motivated, he
is not-he marched in the May Day parade to impress a woman,
not to make a political statement.
E. Hecky's Savior-The Imputed Political Opinion Exception
If Hecky had actually attended the march to show his sup-
port for democratic socialism, but HUAC had interpreted his
actions as support for Soviet-style Communism, we would surely
say that Hecky was persecuted because of his political opinions.
The same applies to the politically motivated neutral. There is no
principled reason for treating one who chooses neutrality and is
persecuted for that neutrality differently from one who chooses
neutrality and is persecuted because others incorrectly interpret
that neutrality as a hostile political opinion. It matters little to
the victim whether his tormentor has correctly understood his
political philosophy. The victim faces persecution because he has
taken a political stand that his persecutor will not accept.
Hecky, of course, did not taken a political stand. He was
motivated by purely personal, apolitical reasons. Nevertheless,
dicta in Elias-Zacarias indicates that the requirement that a
victim's neutrality be politically motivated might give way when
a persecutor misinterprets neutrality (or any other apolitical
behavior) as an unacceptable political opinion."0 The Ninth Cir-
107 767 F2d at 1287.
.0. See 112 S Ct at 815-16.
10 For example, many criminal laws require inquiry into the motivations of the
accused.
000 "Nor is there any indication (even assuming it would suffice) that the guerrillas
erroneously believed that Elias-Zacarias' refusal was politically based." 112 S Ct at 816.
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cuit refers to this exception to the political-motivation-of-the-
victim requirement as the "imputed political opinion" excep-
tion."' This exception corresponds to the third means by which
the First Circuit suggested a neutral asylum-seeker could qualify
as persecuted on account of political belief: when the neutral can
demonstrate that "one or more groups intend to persecute him
because each (incorrectly) thinks he holds the political views of
the other side.""2
The necessity of this exception becomes clear when one re-
calls that the Refugee Act's "well-founded fear of persecution on
account of' language modifies not only political opinion, but also
race, religion, nationality, and membership in a particular social
group."' As G. Joseph Rees, then-General Counsel of the INS,
noted, an excessively strict interpretation of the Elias-Zacarias
motivation requirement might deny asylum relief to "a Mr.
Rosenberg whom the Nazi government of Germany had sen-
tenced to the gas chamber because it erroneously believed him to
be a Jew ... .""' Technically, one might argue that a person
cannot be persecuted because he is a Jew if he is not in fact Jew-
ish. Surely, however, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
meant to sacrifice innocents like Mr. Rosenberg to such a mind-
less formalism.'15  Reasonable intuition suggests that Mr.
Rosenberg is either covered by the Refugee Act, or should be:
"[Tihe most straightforward meaning of the words 'persecu-
tion ... on account of ... religion' would appear to encompass a
program specifically intended to stamp out Judaism even though
implementation of the program should lead to some persecution
of non-Jews."" 6 In other words, the Refugee Act does not pro-
tect religion (or political opinion or any other protected ground)
per se. Instead, it protects those who have been victimized by, for
example, religious intolerance, regardless of whether these vic-
tims actually hold targeted religious beliefs."'
... See Canas-Segovia, 970 F2d at 601-02.
112 Novoa.Umania, 896 F2d at 3.
8 USC § 1101(a)(42)(A).
114 G. Joseph Rees, III, Memorandum: Continued Viability of the Doctrine of Imputed
Political Opinion, reprinted in 70 Interpreter Releases 498, 501 (Apr 12, 1993).
m" See also Note, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias: Partially
Closing the Door on Political Asylum, 52 Md L Rev 478, 495 n 124 (1993).
"l6 Rees, 70 Interpreter Releases at 501. Note that persecution of Jews might also con-
stitute "persecution on account of race" (ethnicity) under the Refugee Act. See 8 USC
§1101(a)(42).
"' Or, in Hecky Brown's case, the Refugee Act should protect him from persecution
arising from HUAC's intolerance of a dissenting political opinion, whether or not Hecky
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Any contrary language in Elias-Zacarias must be understood
in light of the specific facts of that case. The Ninth Circuit had
broadly held that persecution by a political entity (an anti-gov-
ernment guerrilla group) necessarily constituted political persecu-
tion."8 The Court sought to refute this theory by emphasizing
that "[tihe ordinary meaning of the phrase 'persecution on ac-
count of... political opinion'.., is persecution on account of the
victim's political opinion .... ),,. The Court's language need not
be understood, however, as barring an apolitical victim from
gaining asylum when the persecutor's actions are specifically de-
signed and intended to oppress one of the Refugee Act's protected
grounds. As with Mr. Rosenberg in the religion context, a
straightforward interpretation of "persecution on account of polit-
ical opinion" should encompass a program specifically intended to
stamp out political dissent, even though it targets some non-dis-
senters-or neutrals whose neutrality is not politically motivated.
This interpretation does not necessarily conflict with the
Court's position in Elias-Zacarias. The Elias-Zacarias Court
reasoned that under the Refugee Act, the victim's opinion ordi-
narily controls. In the imputed political opinion context, the
victim's opinion controls as well-only the persecutor determines
whether the victim has a political opinion. If the persecutor be-
lieves that the neutral victim has a political opinion, we assume
the victim actually has one.
The imputed political opinion exception to the requirement of
a political motive on the part of the neutral victim will not be-
come the exception that swallows the rule. This exception still
requires proof that the persecutors took the complained-of action
in order to punish the victim for his presumed political views and
not, for example, to fill their ranks.
Accordingly, the non-politically motivated neutral will usual-
ly have a more difficult time proving the political motivation of
the persecutor than the politically motivated neutral. Generally,
persecutors do not provide affidavits setting forth their reasons
for persecuting. Instead, persecutors, like everyone else, generally
do intend the consequences of their actions. Therefore, if a victim
is punished following political behavior, the inference of political
actually subscribes to that opinion.
,' Zacarias v United States INS, 921 F2d 844, 850 (9th Cir 1990). See also
Maldonado-Cruz, 883 F2d at 791.
"' Elias-Zacarias, 112 S Ct at 816 (emphasis added in part).
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persecution is stronger than if the victim is punished following
apolitical behavior.
For example, if a citizen is jailed on trespassing charges for
walking across the lawn of the president's mansion, the inference
of political persecution is weak. If, however, the same citizen is
jailed for trespassing after walking across the lawn with a sign
that says "Down With the President," the inference of political
persecution grows much stronger.
Of course, the first example may in fact be political persecu-
tion, and the second example may merely constitute benign, gen-
erally applicable law enforcement. The point is that while we
should not require a political motivation on the part of the neu-
tral victim in the imputed political opinion context, the Refugee
Act still requires a political motivation on the part of the persecu-
tor. In proving the latter, the neutral who has made a conscious,
public and politically motivated choice of neutrality, for example,
will ordinarily have an easier burden than the neutral who mere-
ly fears combat. Therefore, although Hecky Brown's lack of politi-
cal motivation may make his imputed political opinion case more
difficult to prove, if he can nonetheless prove that he was pun-
ished because HUAC thought he was a Communist, it makes no
difference that he really was not a Communist.
F. A Final Caveat: Insincerely Imputed Political Opinion
The foregoing analysis overlooked a different interpretation
of Hecky Brown's situation: perhaps HUAC knew that Hecky was
not a Communist but sought to punish him nonetheless because
he would not "name names."20 The Ninth Circuit seems to al-
low asylum petitions under such a scenario of insincerely imput-
ed political opinion. In Lazo-Majano v INS, the Ninth Circuit
held that an insincere imputation of political opinion does consti-
tute political persecution. 2' Although the court found that
Lazo-Majano held political opinions for which she faced persecu-
tion in the form of rape and kidnap by a sergeant in the El
Salvadoran military,'22 the majority held that "[elven if she had
2 The film implies as much. See The Front (cited in note 98).
121 See Lazo-Majano v INS, 813 F2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir 1987).
Specifically, the majority held that, placed in its proper "social context," Lazo-
Majano expressed the political views that men do not have the right to dominate women,
that the El Salvadoran military was responsible for many crimes, and that the govern-
ment was not law abiding. Id.
The dissent, however, lampooned the majority's "discovery" of Lazo-Majano's "po-
litical opinions." "Quite simply, the majority has outdone Lewis Carroll in its application
19941 583
The University of Chicago Law Review
no political opinion and was innocent of a single reflection on the
government of her country, the cynical imputation of political
opinion to her is what counts .... ,",u Lazo-Majano thus stands
for the proposition that persecution for personal reasons becomes
persecution for political reasons if the persecutor threatens to
insincerely impute a false political opinion to the victim and then
punish her for it. 24
The problem with the insincerely imputed political opinion
doctrine is that so much turns on the tormentor's choice of weap-
on. Under the Ninth Circuit approach, a woman kidnapped and
raped by an attacker wielding a knife does not suffer political
persecution, but if the attacker instead wields a threat of political
slander, she does. This reasoning ignores the fact that a persecu-
tor who threatens to falsely label the victim with a political opin-
ion is not seeking to punish that opinion at all, for he knows the
opinion is not real but merely his own contrivance.
The purpose of the imputed political opinion doctrine is to
provide refugee relief where the politically motivated persecutor
has made a mistake in his attempt to attack dissenting political
opinion. The insincerely imputed political opinion doctrine turns
this on its head-the persecution is not politically motivated and
the imputation is not a mistake. The doctrine should therefore
have no place in decisions to grant or deny asylum petitions.
CONCLUSION
The BIA and the federal courts have struggled for many
years over political asylum cases in which an alien claims a fear
of persecution that cannot be attributed to traditional political
activities. "In such cases, there is no affirmative act on which to
hang a decision-no bright line to show exactly why the victim
has been targeted."'25
of the term 'political opinion' and in finding that male domination in such a personal rela-
tionship constitutes political persecution." Id at 1437 (Poole dissenting).
'2 Id at 1435.
124 The majority explained that, when the sergeant manipulatively chose to regard
Lazo-Majano as a subversive, "he attribute[d] to her the political opinion of a subversive,
and she [was] being persecuted on account of a political opinion." Id at 1436.
One commentator offers another understanding of Lazo-Majano: "While [Lazo-
Majano's] actual persecutor knew that she was not a subversive and therefore cannot be
said to have persecuted her for her political beliefs, [she] may have had a well-founded
fear that others would persecute her because they believed the sergeant's imputations of
subversiveness to her." Comment, 63 Wash L Rev at 412 n 109 (cited in note 90). While
this may certainly be true and would show a well-founded fear of persecution by "others,"
it does not show political persecution by the sergeant.
" Case Note, Elias-Zacarias v. INS: Neutrality as a Form of Political Opinion, 18 NC
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While many commentators have criticized the Supreme
Court's decision in Elias-Zacarias,28 there is no particular rea-
son to believe that either the Supreme Court or Congress will re-
verse the Court's holding. Yet, in coming to terms with the tricky
issue of neutrality as political opinion, Elias-Zacarias should be
taken as a starting point, not a final pronouncement. A proper
reading of the case yields several principles to guide interpreta-
tion of the Refugee Act's political opinion provision as it relates
to neutrality.
First, the persecutor must persecute for reasons of political
intolerance. Since the persecutor generally will not be present at
trial, the neutral victim might have some difficulty proving that
political considerations motivated his persecutor. Courts should
adopt the First Circuit's solution to this problem-that is, the
victim should be deemed to have been persecuted for political
reasons if he can demonstrate that his persecution is due to (1)
his persecutor's hatred of neutrals, or (2) the victim's refusal to
conform his ideas to his persecutor's political viewpoint. Second,
the alien must ordinarily have had a political motivation for
choosing neutrality. Finally, even if the alien's neutrality was not
politically motivated, he is entitled to refugee protection if the
persecutor sincerely interpreted it as such, under the imputed po-
litical opinion exception.
This Comment has suggested an approach to the neutrality-
as political-opinion issue that is faithful to the purposes of the
Refugee Act and to Supreme Court precedent. The approach
provides refuge to those of "special humanitarian concern to the
United States,"'27 while recognizing "that the United States
cannot accept an unlimited number of refugees from around the
world."1 28 The approach will help achieve the goal of providing
humanitarian relief to the truly politically persecuted neutral,
while assuring that neutrality as political opinion does not be-
come the sinkhole that swallows the rule.
J Intl L & Comm Reg 457, 465 (1993).
12 See generally Case Note, 18 NC J Intl L & Comm Reg 457; Note, 67 Wash L Rev
959 (cited in note 78); Note, 25 Cornell Intl L J 231 (cited in note 81); Comment, Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias: A Departure From the Past, 15 Fordham
Intl L J 1275 (1991-92).
"7 Refugee Act of 1980, § 101(a), Pub L No 96-212, 94 Stat 102 (1980) (congressional
declaration of purpose, included as note to 8 USC § 1521).
'2" Anker and Posner, 19 San Diego L Rev at 11 (cited in note 8).
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